Santa Clara University

Scholar Commons
Religious Studies

College of Arts & Sciences

1998

Modernity and the Satanic Face of God
Michael J. Buckley S.J.
Santa Clara Univeristy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/rel_stud
Part of the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Buckley, M.J. (1998). Modernity and the Satanic Face of God. In P.J. Casarella & G. P. Schner, S.J (Eds.),
Christian Spirituality and the Culture of Modernity. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 100 122.

Reprinted with permission under the CC-BY-NC-ND license. Reuse is only applicable for non-commercial purposes.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Religious Studies by an authorized administrator of Scholar
Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.

CHAPTER 6

Modernity and the Satanic Face of God
MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J.

The religious intellect must recognize that in the nineteenth century it confronts
a unique situation, unprecedented both in the depth of its challenge and in the
extension of its claims. During that period, the denial of the reality of God rose
to achieve an articulate and influential presence within the intellectual culture
of western Europe. This denial was no longer the persuasion of this or that
idiosyncratic figure such as Diagoras of Melos or Theodore of Cyrene in preChristian antiquity; nor did it constitute the mentality of a peculiarly
enlightened cast such as the d'Holbachian circle in Paris in the eighteenth
century. During the nineteenth century, "the eclipse of God" advanced much
farther, descending massively upon modernity and upon the world that it
embraced as non -European nations fell under the influence of Western thought.
This eclipse circumscribed an absence of religious faith or of any living theistic
affirmation, together with an attendant sense of alienation, indifference, or
hostility toward religious doctrines, presence, and institutions. This atheism or
secularism or agnosticism together with its cognate indifference or contempt
for the religious was unique within the history of the world in the public
acceptance it secured during that century, in the ascendancy within particular
subcultures it gained, and in the rapidity of increase it enjoyed among intellectuals and the formative sources of culture. It came to shadow all ranks of society
in Europe, from workers to bourgeoisie to intellectuals, gathering strength to
spill into the twentieth century with an ideational force unmatched since the
Protestant Reformation.
During this steady devolution of religious affirmation, not only did the
judgment about the validity of religious belief fall under suspicion and question,
but the nature or content of religious ideas themselves did as well. The religious
culture of Europe was being reconfigured because the notion of "God" was
being reconfigured. God was coming to be seen now as the alienation of the
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human species in favor of an imaginary subject or as the structure of the human
society now writ large or as the projection out of fear and longing of oedipal
necessities. Each of these reconfigurations lent new shapes to political economy
or theology, literature, philosophy, and rhetoric. Emerging as the psychological
dynamic that explained religious ideas were such terms as Vergegensti:indlichung
and Enti:iusserung, objectification and alienation, and the face of God changed,
as in some way the hermeneutics of suspicion registered the human interests
that had created it. 1
But there was another, very different historical development in modernity's disclosure of the profound projection within religious belief. The initial
grammars of religion revealed that the human was the truth of the divine. The
second wave of interpretation would tear off this mask and see beneath it not
the human but the antihuman. God is revealed as - to borrow a term from
Spanish mysticism - el enemigo de natura humana, the enemy of human nature. The discovery of this equation between the divine and the diabolical was
both the product of the nineteenth century and one of the fundamental reversals
of the sacred in the history of religion. This discovery the following essay
attempts to outline in a series of very broad brush strokes. To do so, it proposes:
(1) to indicate something of the dialectic that lies at the origins of modern
atheism, the paradoxical sources of modern atheism; 2 (2) to examine the radical
shift in fundamental thinking that took place in the nineteenth century- in
what Hobbes called the "First Grounds of Philosophy"; (3) to trace the effect
that this produced in the basic evidence advanced for the reality of God; (4) to
outline some classic moments in the massive rise in atheistic consciousness that
these philosophical and theological arguments dialectically occasioned; (5) to
identify the "god" that emerges from these counterpositions.
I. See Michael J. Buckley, "Atheism and Contemplation;' Theological Studies 40 ( 1979):
680-99. Eugene Kamenka maintains th at "the psychological use of the word 'projection' in
English originated in George Eliot's translation of the Essence of Christianity. She used it to
render Feuerbach's (Hegelian) terms Vergegenstandlichung (objectification, reification ) and
Enti:iusserung (alienation)." See Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 167 n. 43. It should be noted, however, that Ralph
Waldo Emerson, some ten years before Eliot's translation, makes the world "a projection of
God in the unconscious ," and consequently it is "to us, the present expositor of the divine
mind." Nature, in The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Brooks
Atkinson (New York: Random House, 1940), vol. 7, p. 36.
2. I have elsewhere suggested this pattern of internal contradiction at the origins of
modern atheism and would like in this paper to follow it as it was transposed in the nineteenth
century, the golden age of atheism. Cf. Michael J. Buckley, S.J., At the Origins of Modern
Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, I 990). This initial section is little more than a
precis of the findings of that work. For a brilliant and incisive cultural critique of the project
and of the revolution that was modernity, see Louis Dupre, Passage to Modernity: An Essay
in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1993).
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I. At the Origins
The ideational origins of modern atheism lie remarkably with the strategies
employed against it. It was generated and shaped by the attempt to provide for
the affirmation of the existence of God by using the new sciences as the fundamental and irrefragable basis for such an affirmation. Thus Isaac Newton
maintained that the "main Business of natural Philosophy is to argue from
Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects,
till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical." 3 By the
beginnings of the eighteenth century, design in nature furnished the comprehensive warrant for the illation to the affirmation of God. Only a divine cause
could account for design in the universe, from the solar system to the structure
of organic bodies. The inference from design to designer would serve as the
principal foundation for later discussions of the divine nature, moral theology,
and the possibility of divine revelation. Hundreds of studies came out under
the inspiration of so great a genius as Newton, physico-theologies giving the
grounding for the assertions of God by arguing from design in nature. Theologians were generally enthusiastic.
But few noticed what such an approach omitted. It bracketed all religious
experience as cognitively irrelevant, as implicitly empty. While it formulated a
"natural theology" that found patterns in the physical universe and then argued
to a supreme geometer/architect/nav-toxpa-crop - to omnipotent intelligence
and power - it found nothing in the history of the human involvement with
God in Christianity or Judaism that bore seriously upon this issue. The single
phrase that captures the great enterprise : md influence of Isaac Newton was
"universal mechanics," a mechanics that provided not only the foundations of
mathematics, but the rational basis for all theology and religion. Such a universal
mechanics, Newton argued, while all-embracing, must have principles or warranted sources of explanation that were finally not mechanical.
Superseded by this universal mechanics was the attempt of some sixty
years before to provide a rational basis for religion. Descartes, followed by
Malebranche, had formulated a first philosophy that found the warrant for God
in the content of ideas that confronted the thinking subject. For Descartes,
mechanics was a limited, not a universal, discipline, and everything it studied
was to be explained by only mechanical principles. He had saved mechanics
from theology by laying the grounds for the affirmation of the existence of God
in a first philosophy that was not mechanics, but an independent metaphysics.
Thus the disciplines were distinct and mechanics was limited, but it was autonomous.
3. Isaac Newton, Optics, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Influctions, and
Colours of Light, ed. Duane H. D. Roller (New York: Dover, 1952), Query 28, p. 369.
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what one must understand "before" - as the grounding for all other disciplined
inqu iry- altho ugh one often comes upon that " before" long after other disciplines have been pursued. One often comes upon the first last. 4 In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the focus of fund amental thinking was on the
reality that confronted or surrounded the thinkin g subject, whethe r as the
content of ideas as with Descartes or all the phenomena of the physical universe.
Thus Thom as Hobbes, from that intellectual era, would insist that "The First
Gro unds of Philosophy" must deal directly with the physical universe and so
combine the geometry that studied simply the motion of things, as in Galileo's
mechanics, and the physics that bore upon the general properti es of bodies.
After this foundation is laid in a grasp of the nature of things, one can go on
to study the human perso n and political society or the state.

II. The Shift in Fundamental Thinking
In the writings, the enormously influential writings, of John Locke, one can find
the beginnings of an intellectual revolution against this priority of investigation
into the natu re of things or into the Cartesian content of ideas. With Locke, a sea
change began in fundamental thinking. One has only to open to Locke's "Epistle
to the Reader;' the preface to his masterpiece, An Essay concerning Human Understanding. This "Epistle" was necessary, thought Locke, to understand how the essay
itself came about. Many before and after Locke had embarked upon a similar
journey in inquiry. But Locke made the understanding of understanding the
foundation of all explo ration and inquiry. A turn to the subject had already been
initiated by Descartes, but he grounded his first philosophy not upon the processes
of understanding, but upon the content of ideas. In contrast, Locke would study
the processes themselves. Richard Rorty has noted quite correctly: "We owe the
notion of a ' theory of knowledge' based on an understanding of ' mental processes'
to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke." 5 The necessity that an analysis

4. The concept of "fundamental thinking" is derived from Richard McKeon's formulation and use of "genera l selection charac teristics of the phi losophic comm uni cation of a
period " as well as from the di stinctio ns that he drew within general selection and brought
to bear so perceptively upo n the histo ry of th ought. See Richard P. McKeon, "Philosophic
Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry," in Freedom and History and Other Essays: An In troduction
to the Thought of Richard McKean, ed. Zah ava K. McKeon (C hicago: Un iversity of Chicago,
1990), pp. 251-52.
5. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Pri nceton Univers ity
Press, I 980), p. 3. Rorty distinguish es Locke's co ntrib uti on from that of Descartes: "We owe
the notion of 'the mind ' as a sepa rate entity in wh ich 'processes' occur to the same period,
and es pecia lly to Descartes" (pp. 3-4).
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of th e processes of thought form the prior foundation for statements about the
processes of things distinguishes John Locke:
Were it fit to trouble thee with the History of this Essay, I should tell thee
that five or six Friends meeting at my Chamber, and discoursing on a Subject
very remote from this [the principles of morality and revealed religion ], found
themselves quickly at a stand, by the Difficulties that rose on every side. After
we had awhile puzzled our selves, without coming any nearer a Resolution
of those Doubts which perplexed us, it came into my Thoughts that we took
a wrong course; and that, before we set our selves upon Enquiries of that
Nature, it was necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects
our Understandings were, or were not fitted to dea l with. This I proposed to
th e Company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed, that this
should be our first Enquiry. 6
This is very different " fundamental thinking" from that found in Desca rtes or Newto n or Hobbes. In the early months of 1671 , during these
important conversations at Exeter House, Locke was transferring the focus of
foundational tho ught from the exploration of that which confronts the thinkin g subject - such as issues about "the principles of morality and revealed
religion" - to the processes of thinking themselves. 7 The "Epistle to the
Reader" insisted upon an antecedent epistemological foundation, upon a consideration of the potentialities for hum an knowing and their commensurate
"obj ects," before attempting to deal with problems that immediately touch the
nature of things. " First inquiry" should be epistemological. What Locke modestly "proposed to the Company, who all readily assented" in the country home
of Lord Ashley, soon to be first earl of Shaftesbury, was actually a sweeping
change within modernity.
The emphasis that Locke gave to the processes of thought gathered force
in the years that followed and ran full steam into the works and subsequent
influence of Immanuel Kant. His three Critiques were to transpose all fundamental reflection into this new key: "I do not mean by this a critique of books
and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge
after which it may strive independently of all experience. It will therefore decide
as to the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics in general." 8 Before one
6. John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed . Peter H. Nidditch
(Oxfo rd: Cla rendon , 1975), "Ep istle to the Reader," p. 7 (emphasis added ).
7. One of these friends, James Tyrrell, records in the marginalia he appended to his
copy of the essay that the conversation had been "about the principles of morality and
revealed religion." For this, as also for the dating and location of th ese co nversa ti ons, see
Maurice C ranston, John Locke: A Biography (New York: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 140-41.
8. lmmanu el Kant, Critiq ue of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Norma n Kemp Smith
(London: Mac millan, 1963), "Preface to First Edition," p. 9.
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launches into metaphysics or natural theology or universal mechanics, one must
analyze the knowing of the knower to determine what could be known; otherwise human inquiry yielded only transcendental illusion. Before one explores
morality and ethics, one must analyze the practical intellect or Wille and the
human ability to determine itself freely to choose. Before one deals with the
beautiful and the sublime, with taste and genius, one must understand the
reflexivity or harmony that is possible between the imagination in its representations and the understanding in its judgment. Again, Kant did not originate
this flood; he augmented and sanctioned it for the century that was to follow.
Under his blessings, these waters became holy. Disciplines bearing such names
as epistemology or criticism or phenomenologies of spirit or cognitional theory
became foundational in nineteenth-century modernity. One had to look at
human capacities, at the various potentialities for knowledge and choice and
even taste, in order to determine what the proper objects of these potentialities
are. When this was established, one could bring these powers to bear upon
questions of inquiry and decision without the dangers of irresolvable contradiction and conflicts. One must gauge the human first.
The foundational importance of the self-appropriation of the knowing
subject carried persuasion also in theology, entering emphatically into the inquiries of the greatest Protestant theologian of the nineteenth century, Friedrich
Schleiermacher. Here one finds a primordial dependence of all discussion of
theological subjects or the propositions of religion upon the prior assessment
of immediate consciousness, variously formulated as either the feeling and
intuition of the infinite or the feeling of absolute dependence.
Kant and Schleiermacher, as Fred Lawrence has so well maintained, represent two distinctly different kinds of foundational consciousness.9 Kant
tethered reason, understanding, or judgment to consciousness as a perception
of objects; like Rousseau, Schleiermacher rooted them in the perception of
feelings, the feeling of feeling, that he sometimes referred to as "sentiment."
What Kant was for philosophy, Schleiermacher was for theology. Both gave a
foundational priority to human subjectivity- not in the sense of an arbitrary
imposition of meanings, but in the sense of the subject as agent, possessing its
own internal structure of mind or spirit, whose capacities must be determined
as the fundamental security for subsequent affirmations. For both, the human
subject came first; the human subject would measure the things that it would
engage. Not nature, but human nature had become fundamental.

9. Fred Lawrence, "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern
Concern for the Other," Theological Studies 54 (1993): 58-62.
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III. Theistic Argumentation in a New Key
As this revolution swept through modernity, Kant and Schleiermacher transposed the arguments for the reality of God into a new key. They formulated
disciplines for so much of the philosophy and theology that would follow them,
disciplines that were to shift the issue of God to human subjectivity for its
fundamental point of departure. Kant provided critiques, while Schleiermacher
explored "religion." In both God emerged as a necessity to deal with human life
and experience. God was an entailment of the human.
The Critique of Practical Reason laid the foundation for ethical reasoning
and for the metaphysics of morals in the centrality of human freedom . The
living of a human life, the entire ethical enterprise, presupposed human nature
as free. Freedom - which was to dominate the nineteenth century's inquiries
into the human - identified with the subjectivity that was human nature and
was itself the originator of the moral life:
By "nature of man" we here intend only the subjective ground of the exercise
(under objective moral laws) of man's freedom in general; this ground whatever is its character - is the necessary antecedent of every act apparent
to the senses. But this subjective ground, again, must itself always be an
expression of freedom (for otherwise, the use or abuse of man's power of
choice [ Willkiir] in respect of the moral law could not be imputed to him
nor could the good or bad in him be called moral). Hence the source of evil
cannot lie in an object determining the will [ Willkiir] through inclination,
nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in a rule made by the will [ Willkiir]
for the use of its freedom, i.e. in a maxim. 10
Freedom in Kant is both potency and act. It is the transcendental power
to choose, the independence of Willkiir from determination by external objects
and by the impulses of past or present. It is the reflexive self-legislation of
Willkiir, shown in its selection of maxims by which to govern its exercise and
in its selection of objects upon which its actions will devolve. One is free in
transcendental freedom because one is one's own master, coerced in the process
of choice by no external master. Secondly, freedom is also actualization or
autonomy. Autonomy occurs when one chooses in accordance with the universal law, living free from external determination and realizing in actuality the
moral potentiality of the human. Heteronomy occurs when one renounces one's
power as a free being by choosing to act dependently upon the determinations
of desires. In this sense, human life is the movement from freedom to freedom,
l 0. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Th eodo re M.
Greene and Hoyt H. Hud son , with a new essay by John R. Silber (New York: Harper a nd
Row, 1960), bk. I, pp. 16- 17.
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the freedom of Willkiir to the freedom of autonomy, the freedom of potentiality
to the freedom of actuality, and the path to this freedom of autonomy constitutes the ethical enterprise its elf. 11
For the internal coherence of human freedom, i.e., for human life to make
sense morally, one must postulate the existence of God. The austere ethical
imperative is to do one's duty, and duty dictates that one strive for the highest
human good. This object conjoins virtue (dictated by duty) and happiness
(which objectively ought to be united with virtue). The virtuous deserve to be
happy. If this highest human good is imperative, it must be possible, and for
this "possibility we must postulate a higher, moral, most holy, and omnipotent
Being which alone can unite the two elements of this highest good." 12 Without
God, the ethical or moral life is a movement into absurdity. One would be
morally commanded or directed toward the impossible, toward a conjunction
of happiness and virtue that only happenstance effects in human life - and
even this rarely. Morality is only rationally coherent if the object of morality is
itself seriously possible. Thus what human beings cannot effect must be within
the power of another. There must be that omnipotent intelligence that can make
possible the object of command, the "highest good." "Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful
moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of
creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man's final end." 13 In
this way, God alone makes rational morality possible for human beings, and
Jesus Christ is the exemplification of this morality.
For Schleiermacher, "religion" becomes the foundation for dogmatics and
indeed for his greatest work, Die Glaubenslehre, and the basis of all religion is
the consciousness of the infinite, or what in his more mature work he would
call "the feeling of absolute dependence:' Kant had deliberately excluded experience from the exercise of human freedom because "the philosopher, as teacher
of pure reason (from unassisted principles a priori [in ethics]), must confine
himself within the narrower circle, and, in so doing, must abstract from all
experience." 14 For Schleiermacher, there is no parallel refusal of experience in
11. See John R. Silber, "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion," introduction to
Kant, Religion, pp. Lxxx-xcvi.
12. Kant, Religion, "Preface to the First Edition," pp. 4-5.
13. Kant, Religion, " Preface," pp. 5-6. The classic treatment of the existence of God as
a postulate of pure practical reason is, of course, in book II of Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason, chapter 5, "The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason." See
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1956), pp. 128-36.
14. Kant, Religion, p. 11. Th is translation has been modified, since the German reads:
"... von alJer Erfahrung abstrahieren mu£ ...." Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der
Grenzen der bloflen Vernunft, ed. Karl Vorlander (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), p. 13.
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favor of illation. On the contrary, one appeals to the fundamental experience
that underlies all inference and even differentiated thought. Whether that immediacy be termed " intuition" or "feeling," it denotes a fundamental awareness,
a self-consciousness given in every act of cognition. Now this self-consciousness
is inseparable from God-consciousness - as doubt in Descartes is inseparable
from existence:
To feel oneself absolutely dependent and to be conscious of being in relation
with God are one and the same thing; and the reason is that absolute dependence is the fundamental relation which must include all others in itself. This
last expression includes the God-consciousness in the human self-consciousness in such a way that, quite in accordance with the above analysis, the two
cannot be separated from each other. . .. God is given to us in feeling in an
original way. 15
God is an illation of ethics in Kant, making duty's object, the highest good,
seriously possible; God is a given of the primordial experience of self-consciousness in Schlei~rmacher.
Through the influence of both thinkers, a critically important shift was
taking place in modernity that would resituate fundamental thinking about the
divine reality, a shift that Tennyson would both celebrate in In Memoriam and
comment upon at the end of his life. He saw that the heady days of the religious
use of nature were passing, or at least diminishing. Charles Lyell's Principles of
Geology (1830-33 ), with its demonstrations of the great age of the earth and
the successive and massive extinction of species, had left "Nature red in tooth
and claw/ With ravine." Tennyson found that nature "shriek'd against his creed;'
leaving those who depended upon Nature's witness convinced that they must
regard "life as futile, then, as frail." 16 The nineteenth-century thinker must turn
elsewhere:
Yet God is love, transcendent, all-pervading! We do not get this faith from
Nature or the world. If we look at Nature alone, full of perfection and
imperfection, she tells us that God is disease, murder and rapi ne. We get this
faith from ourselves, from what is highest within us, which recognizes that
there is not one fruitless pang, just as there is not one lost good.'7
15. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. MacIntosh and J. S. Stewart
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928), introduction, n. 4, p. 17 (emphasis added).
16. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Tennyson: In Memoriam, ed. Susan Shatto and Marian Shaw
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), section 56, lines 15- 16, 25, p. 80.
17. This remark is cited by his son and introduced with the remark: "After one of these
moods in the su mmer of 1892, he [Tennyson] exclaimed ...." See Hallam, Lord Tennyson,
Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir (New York: Macmillan, 1897), as cited in Alfred, Lord
Tennyson, In Memoriam, ed. Robert H. Ross (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 119. For the
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"This faith from ourselves, from what is highest within us ...." Nature,
for all the physics and universal mechanics it evokes, stills carries its history of
destruction and deaths . It cannot establish the warrant for the existence of God.
One must rather go to the inferences entailed by the critique of practical reason
or to the experience fundamental to religion. For all of their contrasts and even
contradictory procedures, what both critique and the analysis of religion have
in common is what they both take as foundational: the radically human - in
contradistinction with subhuman nature. The Kantian critique recognized that
ethics engages an (ICtivity that is uniquely human, the way human beings should
decide and act and live; Schleiermacher saw that human passivity is engaged by
religion, the manner of human experience, preconceptual "feelings," change
worked by the influence of an object, which reveals its existence to one in the
inner consciousness.
The same is true for religion. The same actions of the universe through which
it reveals itself to you in the finite also bring it into a new relationship to your
mind and your condition; in the act of intuiting it, you must necessarily be
seized by various feelings. In religion, however, a different and stronger relationship between intuition and feeling takes place, and intuition never predominates so much that feeling is almost extinguished.
On the contrary, is it really a miracle if the eternal world affects the senses
of our spirit as the sun affects our eyes? Is it a miracle when the sun so blinds
us that everything else disappears, not only at that moment, but even long
afterward all objects we observe are imprinted with its image and bathed in
its brilliance? Just as the particular manner in which the universe presents
itself to you in your intuitions and determines the uniqueness of your individual religion, so the strength of these feelings determines the degree of
religiousness. 18
Nature does not provide the warrant for God; the warrant for God is found in
human nature, either active in its choices or passive in its immediate experience
or feeling.
So profound and pervasive is this shift to human nature as foundational
for dealing with the reality of God that both Kant and Schleiermacher can cite
it as the linchpin of their fundamental works. Kant's four books on religion
become the study of human nature:

influence of Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology (1830-33 ) and its demonstrations of the
great age of the earth and the successive extinction of species, see Eleanor D. Mattes, In
Memoriam: Th e Way of a Soul (New York: Exposition Press, 1951 ), pp. 55-61, 73-86, 111-25,
as excerpted in Alfred, Lord Tennyson, ed. Ross, pp. 120ff.
18. Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans.
Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Speech II, pp. 109-10.
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In order to make apparent the relation of religion to human nature (endowed
in part with good, in part with evil predispositions), I represent, in the four
following essays, the relationship of the good and evil principles as that of
the two self-subsistent active causes influencing men. 19
The purpose of Schleiermacher's Reden is stated: "I wish to lead you to the
innermost depths from which religion first addresses the mind. I wish to show
you from what capacity of humanity religion proceeds, and how it belongs to
what is for you the highest and dearest." Precisely for its engagement of the
human in such depths, this inquiry is not for all, maintains Schleiermacher, but
only for "you" who are capable of "raising yourselves above the common standpoint of humanity, you who do not shrink from the burdensome way into the
depths of human nature in order to find the ground of its actions and
thought." 20
And how does one move "into the depths of human nature"? Through
the differentiation among three disciplines and the recognition and prosecution
of religion as one of them. For metaphysics finds its essence in thinking; morality, in acting and doing; but religion, in intuition and feeling. In Schleiermacher,
God emerges as the active source of these feelings; God is even given a nominal
definition in terms of the feeling of absolute dependence: "the Whence of our
receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be
designated by the word 'God,' and that this is for us the really original signification of that word." 21 The original human awareness of God is simply of that
which is the codeterminant in this feeling. Thus to feel oneself absolutely
dependent and to be conscious of being in relation to God is one and the same
thing. In this sense, God is given to immediate human awareness, i.e., in feeling,
in "an original way." Indeed, this can be recognized as "an original revelation
of God to man or in man."22
One can only remark about the radical contrast this offers to the major
and most influential thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In
these previous centuries, heady with the emergence of the universal competence
of the new mechanics, nature or design or the content of ideas or things had
provided the evidence for asserting the divine existence. Now the battleground
is confined to human nature and its entailments. This recasting of the foundations of religion provides the theological point of departure for the nineteenth
century: What is it to be human, and how does this warrant necessitate the
affirmation or denial of God?

19. Kant, Religion, p. 10.
20. Schleiermacher, On Religion, p. 87.
21. Schleiermacher, Th e Christian Faith, p. 16.
22 . Schleiermacher, Th e Christian Faith, pp. 17-18.
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IV. The Humanistic Foundations of the Emergent Atheism
The dialectical reversal of theistic positions that obtained in early modernity
repeated itself analogously within the changed coordinates of the nineteenth
century. In these earlier centuries, the strategies to rationalize the divine existence furnish the weapons to attack. The positive generated its own commensurate self-contradiction. In the nineteenth century, philosophy and theology had
moved to ground religious affirmation on the entailments of human nature;
now they will be contradicted on the same ground in the struggle that Henri
de Lubac so aptly called "the drama of atheistic humanism." 23
One must begin with the originating genius of this movement, Ludwig
Feuerbach - a Bavarian theological student become philosopher under the
instruction of Hegel, only to become atheist - the man whose writings were
so successful, so influential that Marx saluted him as the great precursor of
dialectical atheism and Freud held him as his favorite philosopher. 24 Atheism
came as the climax of his intellectual development, and he summarized the
steps of his growth in this way: "God was my first thought; Reason my second;
Man, my third and last thought." 25 Respect for the character of nineteenthcentury fundamental thinking dictated that Feuerbach begin the Essence of
Christianity with an analysis of the essential nature of the human person as
self-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of species. He could deduce his conclusions about the source and object of religion from the phenomenon that human
beings have religion while brutes do not, and that this must derive from this
species-consciousness. In his third edition he placed his central thesis at the
very beginning: "The essence of the human being [self-consciousness] in differentiation from the beasts is not only the ground or cause, but also the object
of religion." 26 The figure of God, the object of religion, is a projection of the
human essence. God is the human writ large as species.
Feuerbach argues to this cardinal fact of projection, that the true sense of
23. Henri de Lubac, The Drama of Atheistic Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley (New
York: Sheed and Ward, 1950).
24. See Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, pp. vii-viii, 16, 27, 117-18; Peter
Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 28-29, 532. On March 7, 1875,
Freud wrote to Edward Silverstein: ''Among all philosophers, I worship and admire this man
(Feuerbach) the most." See Gay, p. 28.
25. Cited from Ludwig Feuerbach's Philosophical Fragments by Kamenka , p. 39.
26. Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, ed. Werner Schuffenhauer, 3rd
ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), p. 29 n. 3. This sentence appears in the third edition,
done in 1849 while Feuerbach still lived. The celebrated English translation, The Essence of
Christianity, trans. George Eliot from the 2nd rev. ed. of 1843 (New York: Harper, 1957), was
first published in London in 1854. The German original of this addition to the third edition
reads: "Das Wesen des Menschen im Unterschied vom Tiere ist nicht nur der Grund, sondern
auch der Gegendstand der Religion."
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theology is anthropology, from three dimensions of human nature: human
conscio usness, linguistic predication, and the history of human alienation conscio usness, language, and history.
( 1) The nature of human self-consciousness: the object that is essentially
known reveals the subject to itself. When such an essential object does not have
its independent existence guaranteed by sense perception, it is nothing more
than the essential nature of the subject. (2) The essential humanity of the divine
attributes - such as wise, blessed, provident: What is predicated of God is taken
from human experience and is true of human beings alone. Now the truth of
the subj ect is found in its predicates. Since the divine predicates are human,
their subject is also human. (3) Commensurate alienation: what human beings
ascribe to God has been historically subtracted or alienated from the human
essence. One can trace this through the history of religions or theology. That
God may be enriched as good and holy, the human person must be seen as
poor and sinful. 27
That such projection of the human into an alien subject should take place
is to be understood as a stage in human self-appropriation through otherness.
If one fixates at this stage, however, one formulates the illusions that are theology. But the developments of cultural history have reached a time of further
progress. Philosophy, now the interpreter of the truth of religion , is called to
reappropriate these "divine" attributes for the human, to restore to human
beings their grandeur. One does not eliminate the divine predicates, but only
the imaginary divine subject of these attributes. The attributes are true not of
this supernatural illusion, but of the human actuality. What is "God" in this
state of illusion? The alienation of the human from itself: "a perversion, a
distortion ; which, however, the more perverted and false it is, all the more
appears to be profound." 28 Feuerbach's inquiries mount what is basically a
philosophical grammar in the medieval sense of "grammar" as a scientia interpretandi or ars interpretandi, a science or a technique for the understanding of
the meaning of fundamental symbols.29
Karl Marx acce pted Feuerbach's critique of religion, but modified it in
two ways: he insisted upon the social-economic sources of the origin and
fixation of this projection; and he rejected Feuerbach's strategy of reflexive
assimilation or hermeneutical recognition in favor of the destructive and trans27. This is the burden of th e initial chapter of The Essence of Christia nity. These three
basic argume nt are repea ted in Feuerbach's other works. See Feuerbach, The Essence of
Christianity, pp. 1-32.
28. Fe uerbach, The Essence of Ch ristianity, p. 231.
29. For the medieval sense of "grammar," see Michael J. Buckley, S.J., "Towards the
Constructio n of Theology: A Response to Richard McKeon," Journ al of Religion 58, Supplement (1978): S58-S59, esp. n. 15. It was Rabanus Maurus who recaptured fo r the Middle
Ages the defi ni tion of Mari us Victorin us and brought it to bea r upon the world of symbols.
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formational activity of the "revolutionary principle." He changed Feuerbach's
human person from a contemplative interpreter to a practical agent whose
transitive activity is to change social structures. One does not simply interpret
alienation; one destroys it - in the social order. Marx moved materialism from
a reflexive principle to a revolutionary principle. This shift is what Marx refers
to in his classic eleventh thesis against Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it:' 30
Grammar was not enough, and if grammar was the discipline most analogous
to Feuerbach's enterprise, rhetoric seems most apt for Marx.
The human being is sensuous and practical, and for this emphasis Marx
changes the meaning of this last term, collapsing the distinction between Aristotle's 1tpal;tc; and 1toC:XytTJcrtc; - so that "practical" now contains the "poetic"
activity that creates a new world. The human being is not an abstract essence,
but economic and social and essentially called to a much greater factive activity
than Feuerbach understood. The failure of Feuerbach's materialism was that it
did not grasp human activity's. revolutionary and transitive (not contemplative )
character, that it essentially passes into the external world and into the lives of
other human beings, that it inescapably forms community, and that this practical activity constitutes all reality, all objects.
Truth is not discovered; it is constituted by this activity. Human beings
make their world true. Anything else is scholasticism! To realize this human
dynamism in practice is to come into possession of one's humanity. This realization of what it means to be human carries with it an enormous responsibility
for the world and for the lot of human beings. The philosopher must not simply
realize this alienation that religion entails, but must destroy it in its social and
economic roots. "Once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the
holy family, the former must then itself be criticized in theory and revolutionized in practice." 31 Religious critique has a priority over economics and
politics; it is the presupposition of all other criticism. Marx's Contribution to
the Critique ofHegel's Philosophy ofRight insists that only this critique can restore
the human essence to the human being, make the human being free enough to
drive this criticism deeper into the criticism of right and of politics for "religion
is only the illusory sun which revolves round man as long as he does not revolve
round himself:' 32 Hence to restore the revolutionary principle to the human
30. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach;' in Marx and Engels on Religion, introduction
by Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 72 (emphasis added).
31. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," Thesis no. 4, p. 70.
32. Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in Marx and
Engels on Religion, pp. 41-42. "The abolition of religion as th e illusory happiness of the people
is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions abo ut its condition
is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusion. The criticism of religion is therefore
in embryo the criticism of the vale of woe, the halo of which is religion" (p. 42).
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mea ns a critiqu e of fun da m ental h um an ali enati o n, religion, an d on ly "the
criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest essence for
man, hence with th e categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in wh ich m an
is debased , enslaved, abando ned, des pica ble essence." 33
In a stunning reversal of Kant and Schleierm acher, God is now the one
who ali enates men and wo men fro m th eir hum anity, both specul atively as in
Fe uerbach and ideo logically in the eco nomic and social structure in which
huma n beings live. It is no t eth ics th at God makes poss ible; it is ali enation and
exploitatio n.
Marx had reali zed this as ea rly as his docto ra l dissertatio n . Lo ng before
he elaborated a d ialectica l humani sm , he had ab ridged and made his own the
words of Prometheus fro m Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound (I. 975): "i:x'J\ rrAw
Aoyw, 1:0u<; rrcxvrnu<; £X0mpw ernu <;." Pro m etheus beco_m es th e hero of philosophy, and his declara tio n is truncated by Marx to become the maxi m for
humanity and the miss ion of philosophy. Philosophy must take from Pro m etheus "its own m otto agai nst all gods, heavenl y a nd ea rthly, w ho do no t ackn owledge the conscio usness of m a n as the suprem e divin ity." 34 Human conscio usn ess, still th e foc us of fund amental thinkin g, was not to yield abso lute
dependence, but in sh a rp contrast its own absolute suprem acy. Even as ea rl y as
March of 184 1, God was posed as the antith esis - not th e suppo rt o r engagem ent - of a free hum an life.
It is cr itically importa nt to see that th e destructio n o f belief in God became
fo r Marx a n ethical imperative - no t simply a political or social stra tegy. Marx
even empl oys Kant's vocabu lary: this destructio n is a "categorical imperative ." 35
Religiou s t hinkers can never understand th e character of auth enti c Ma rxism
unless they understand this profoundly m oral commitm ent, as if to the sta m p in g o ut of a virulent disease. Marx's is o ne of th e earli est expressio ns of this
hatred fo r the perso n of God, fo und in his dissertati o n with its apotheosis of
the perso n of Pro m eth eus.36 What C hri st is to Kant, Pro methe us is to Marx:
the embodim ent of a mo rally developed humanity. W ith the Prom etheus of
33. Marx, Contribution, p. 50; emp hasis in the or iginal. T hi s project, the criticism of
religion, contai ns the fun dame ntal ca ll to be rad ica l: "To be rad ica l is to grasp the root of
th e ma tter. But for ma n the ropt is m an h imself. T he ev ident proof of the radical ism of
Germa n theory, and hence of it's practical energy, is that it proceed s from a reso lute positive
aboliti o n of religion."
34. Ka rl Marx, The Difference between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and the
Natural Philosophy of Epicurus, "Forward to T hes is," in Marx and Engels 011 Religio n, p. I 5.
The fu ll sentence in Aeschylu s read s: " In o ne wo rd , I hate a ll the gods that rece ived good at
m y han d and with ill req ui te me wro ngfully," as in th e tra nslatio n of Herbert Weir Smyth,
Aeschylus, Loeb C lass ica l Library (Ca m br idge: Ha rva rd, 1973 ), p. 305.
35. Marx, Contribution, p. 42.
36. For an illum ina ting deve lopme nt of th is theme, see Joseph C. McLelland, Prometheus Rebound: The Irony of Atheism (Wa terloo: W il frid La ur ier University Press, 1988 ).
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Marx, humanity is now in competition with God. God, the relentless enemy of
Prometheus, is the antihuman. To destroy this God constitutes a moral claim
upon human bein gs, just as Prometheus knew and suffered for the death of
Zeus that was to come if Prometheus remained faithful - a death devoutly to
be wished.
Ethics and the death of God merged in Friedrich Nietzsche in two ways.
The death of God is already a cultural, even an epistemological, phenomenon:
belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable.37 His death is not an event
to come or to be worked, as with Marx, but an event which has already occurred;
but, like the bursting of a great star billions of light-years away, its news has
not yet reached human beings - though human beings have effected this death
themselves. And how have human beings accomplished this? By their own
cultural development, a development into the forms of knowledge and morality
that Nietzsche's Gay Science traces through the first three books that build to
the death of God. Human beings have developed from a growing set of perceptions and experiences, uncommon common sense about humanity (bk. 1),
through advances in affectivity and art (bk. 2), to disciplined knowledge, logic,
science, and morals - all of which lead inevitably to the death of God (bk. 3 ).
Human development necessitates God's death . Moral courage demands that
this death be acknowledged.
One should emphasize that Nietzsche is not arguing an ontological
change, but an epistemological one, something very close to the sociology of
knowledge: Christian belief has become unbelievable. He is asserting what is
incapable of human fai th any longer. Locke wished to establish which objects
human understanding is capable of entertaining; Nietzsche determines which
objects are capable of belief - and the Christian faith in God is not among
them. One can no longer believe even in this belief. Unlike Marx, Nietzsche
does not attempt to bring this death to pass, but to formulate a teaching to deal
with its aftermath.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra celebrates Zarathustra as a moral teacher of a
wisdom he is eager to give away. His teaching is to counter the nihilism that
could issue o ut of the death of God. His premise is almost the exact opposite
of Kant's conclusion: the ethical enterprise emerges in its shape and necessity
from the cultural fact of the death of God: "I teach you the Overman." 38 The
37. Nietzsche's specification of the death of God is precise an d nuanced and deserves
to be cited as a corrective to its misunders tanding in popular usages: "Das groBte neuere
Ereigniss, - daB 'Gott todt ist,' das der Glaube an den christlichen Gott un glaubwti rdig ist
- beginnt bereits seine ersten Schatten tiber Europa zu werfen." See Friedrich Nietzsche, Die
Frohliche Wissenshaft, V, no. 343, in Giorgio Colli and Massino Montinari, Nietzsche Werke,
Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), vol. 2, pt. 5, p. 255.
38. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Viking Press, 1968), prologue, no. 3, p. 12 (p unctuat ion slightly altered).
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Overman becomes the new moral ideal. The position Prometheus held in the
honor of Marx, the Overman holds in the moral aspirations of Nietzsche: the
human must be overcome in the heroic progress to the Overman. The mission
of Zarathustra takes its issue from this call of the heroic: "I shall show them the
rainbow and all of the steps to the Overman." 39 His instructions stood in
contrast to the lessons of the "teachers of virtue" and their securing of contagious sleep for humanity. 40
If the Overman is the great challenge to human history, the will to power
is its basic moral energy: "A new will I teach men: to will this way which man
has walked blindly, and to affirm it, and no longer to sneak away from it like
the sick and decaying." 41 The heroic will constituted the fundamental moral
dynamism. "Alas, that you would understand my word: 'Do whatever you will,
but first be such as are able to will.' "42 And the entire "On Old and New Tablets"
builds in hymn to the sovereign will: "O thou my will! Thou cessation of all
need, my own necessity! Keep me from all small victories! Thou destination of
my soul, which I call destiny! Thou in-me! Over-me! Keep me and save me for
a great destiny!" 43
But all of this is cast into ambiguity when the realization dawns that no
victory or no achievement is final, tha_t there is no final overcoming. The return
of all things and of all states is sempiternal. All victories are provisional. With
a finite amount of matter in the universe and an eternal quantity of time,
everything must reoccur endlessly- indeed had already endlessly reoccurred. 44
All of the past, even the "last man;' will return, and return endlessly. 45 The hope
for something beyond the provisional only mirrors the efforts and the history
of Sisyphus. This realization works a profound change in Zarathustra. He becomes the teacher of the eternal recurrence, and this intractable return of the
same posed the fundamental challenge to the project to which he has given his
life. The eternal return becomes the alternative to the creating God.
Thus Spoke Zarath ustra must put the three together: the Overman, the
will to power, and the eternal return. One becomes the Overman - realizes the
possibilities of her or his humanity supremely- by willing absolutely the

39. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, prologue, no. 9, p. 24; see no. 3, p. 12.
40. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. I, no. 2, "On the Teachers of Virtue," pp.
28-30.
41. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. I, no. 3, "On the Afterworldly," p. 32.
42. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. Ill, no. 5, "On Virtue That Makes Small,"
p. 172.

43. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. III, no. 12, "On Old and New Tablets;' p. 214.
44. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. Ill, no. 2, "On the Vision and the Riddle,"
pp. 155-56.
45. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pt. III, no. 13, "The Convalescent;' pp. 217-20.
Zarathustra is taught by the an imals to accept and to proclaim the eternal return.
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eternal return, by loving and accepting the eternal return. 46 This radically redefines the heroic human being. He or she becomes a process of development,
of advance toward the Overman. The finality of human nature is to become a
bridge to the Overman, while the foundation of human nature is fundamentally
the will to power. Human activity must be recognized in its possibilities and in
its glory in these terms.
Nietzsche can then move atheistic consciousness to a deeper level than
Marx. What is God? The antihuman, the destruction of the entire heroic and
humanistic project of Zarathustra and the progression of humanity to the Overman. God is the limit, the finitude of humanity. All of Zarathustra's doctrine
pounds against God as against its absolute contradiction . "But let me reveal my
heart to you entirely, my friends: If there were gods, how could I endure not to be
a god! Hence there are no gods. Though I drew this conclusion, now it draws
me."47 The human being and God: one is necessarily the refusal of the other.
Lastly, human development is furthered by Sigmund Freud in a manner
no less passionate than Friedrich Nietzsche's. Freud undertakes his treatment
of religion and religious ideas in order to call his readers to advance beyond
illusion into a world where affirmations are rationally gro unded, through a
process that he terms '" education to reality.' Need I confess to you that the sole
purpose of my book is to point out the necessity for this forward step? "48 The
removal of God, of this illusion, will throw human beings on their own reso urces, as both Marx and Nietzsche also argued. Only then will one learn to
make a proper use of human abilities. Atheism emerges in Freud's writings as
a necessary condition for the Enlightenment's proj ect of self-realization and
self-reliance. The destruction of conviction about God is the beginning of
authentic human freedom, though Freud's resultant ethics emerges much more
stoic than that of his predecessors. For
men are not entirely without assistance. Their scientific knowledge has taught
them much since the days of the Deluge, and it will increase their power still
furthe r. And , as for the great necessities of Fate, against whi ch there is no
help, they will learn to endure them with resignation.49
Like Nietzsche, Fre ud found in the advance of science the ext irpation of religion.
Through a consideration of the ori gins and path of development, thought
Freud, one can offer an assessment of the past and trace th e emergence of God
46. Nietzsche, Thu s Spoke Z arath us tra, pt. III, no. 16, "The Seven Seals (O r: The Yes
and Amen Song)," pp. 228-31.
47. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Z arathustra, pt. II, no. 2, "Upon the Blessed Isles," p. 86.
48. Sigm und Freud, Th e Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York:
Norton , 1961), p. 49 (emphasis his).
49. Fre ud , The Future of an Jllu sion, p. 50.
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and religion as a mental asset for the self- protection of civilization. The basic
force or drive behind any human development, even that of religious ideas, is
the same: "The libido there follows the paths of narcissistic needs and attaches
itself to the objects which ensure the satisfaction of those needs." 50 To understand the needs out of which religion has come, it is essential to recognize that
parallel to the components of the total human personality - the superego, the
ego, and the id - stands the corresponding and massive cultural triad that is
civilization , the human person, and nature. These are lodged in continual hostility and threat - and their intractable struggle provides the context or horizon
of intelligibility for the emergence of religion. Each component is mortally
hostile to the others and must maintain its own integrity, influence, and control
through continual dominance. 51 Hostility, threat, struggle, and control - these
character ize the context in which Freud examines religion.
Within this structure of endl ess conflict, one asks about the psychological significance of religious ideas. They are technically illusion; that is, beliefs
not grounded in evidence but in wish fulfillment and formulated to handle
the threats delivered by nature and by civilization. 52 Seemingly promising,
these illusions are ultim ately destructive of human growth. Religion apes, as
well as supports, civilizatio n. Civilization is constituted by knowledge and
regulations; religion, by beliefs and practices. Religion mirrors, as well as
suggests, psychopathologies: as beliefs or illusion, religion corresponds to
Meynert's amentia, a "state of acu te hallucinatory confusion"; and as practice,
it can be seen as a universal obsessive neurosis - issuing out of the Oedipus
comp lex. 53 Religion is ersatz civilization, substituting for the knowledge and
rationa l conduct of culture irrational beliefs and obsessive practices. When
civi li zation is inadequate or when it falters, religion subsumes the three tasks
of civilization against nature: human "self-regard, seriously menaced, call for
consolation; life and the universe must be robbed of their terrors; moreover,
human curios it y, moved, it is true, by the strongest practical interest,
demands an answer." 54 On the other hand, the beliefs and practices of religion
can reconcile the human person to the instinctual renunciations demanded
by civilization.
The lengthy genesis of the idea of God can be traced from pre-animistic
or magical stages, animistic stages, through totemism and polytheism to monotheism. For Freud also, the "death of God" occurs, but not as the Marxist project
for the future or Nietzsche's epistemological fact in the recent past. This death

50. Freud ,
5 1. Freud ,
52. Freud,
53 . Freud ,
54. Freud,

Th e Future of an
The Fu ture of an
Th e Future of an
The Future of an
The Future of an

Jllusion,
Jllu sion,
Illusion,
Illu sion,
Illusion,

p. 24.
chaps. 1-2, pp. 5-14.
pp. 30-33.
p. 43 and n. 3.
p. 16.

120

MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J.

occurs rather at the origins of religion - as the historical event of the killing
and eating of the primeval father by the sons, the regret and fear that followed
this event and the rules of totemism that arose as an attempt to ease the guilt
and to appease the father. God emerges out of human history, rather than out
of ethics (as with Kant) or out of human religious experience (as with Schleiermacher). The death of God is not the terminus of belief, as with Nietzsche, but
its origin. As he wrote in his study of Leonardo da Vinci: "Psycho-analysis has
made us aware of the intimate connection between the father-complex and
belief in God, and has taught us that the personal God is psychologically nothing
other than a magnified father." 55
God is not a neutral statement leveled at humanity. Religious ideas become
destructive of the human, inhibiting responsibility and growth. "The whole
thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly
attitude to humanity, it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals
will never be able to rise above this view of life." 56 So profoundly does God
inhibit human development that religion can be listed as the great enemy of
science: "Of the three powers which may dispute the basic position of science,
religion alone is to be taken seriously as an enemy." 57
What is the future of religious ideas, of God? Marginalization and extinction. There will be an increasing turning away from religion as human beings
develop in their rationality, and to inhibit this disengagement would be to
inhibit that human development. Gradually, painfully, the human intellect is
coming into its own and breaking the bonds around it, placed and tightened
by religion: "The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it
has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds.
This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future
of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance... . The primacy
of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but probably not in an
infinitely distant one." 58 The lines between the enlightened and the religious
could not be more antagonistically drawn: rational and irrational, humane
development and blind inhibitions, knowledge and belief, realistic and obsessive
practice.

55. Sigmund Freud, Leonard da Vinci and a Memory of His Childhood, trans. James
Strachey (New York: Norto n, n.d.), p. 103. See Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans.
Katherine Jones (New York: Vintage, 1939) , pt. III , sec. 1, pp. 102- 10.
56. Sigmund Fre ud, Civilizatio n and Its Discon tents, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New
York: Norton, 1961 ), p. 21.
57. Sigm und Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. and ed. James
Strachey (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 160.
58. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 53 (e mphasis his).
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V. A Reflection
The apologetics of the early nineteenth century argued to the reality of God
from human nature and its entailments: God makes possible human life in the
fullest sense. The rising atheism of the later decades of that century also took
the human as the point of departure, as the arena within which the struggle
was to be conducted, and argued exactly to the opposite conclusion: God
alienates humanity from itself and from its promise.
This attack was conducted by a philosophical anthropology that moved
through differing and at times overlapping levels in its analysis of the human
being and of human development. Feuerbach saw the human being as sensuous
self-consciousness, with this self-consciousness uniquely able to focus upon the
human species; for Marx, this sensuous self-consciousness was both socially
constituted in communal solidarity and called to engage in human life as
revolutionary praxis; for Nietzsche, what lay beneath all praxis, however revolutionary, was the human being as the dynamism of the will to power, the bridge
to the Overman and heroic human transcendence; for Freud, the human being
was psychologically constituted even in the eros of its self-affirmation and life
by its collective and personal history, and by the inner struggles of its psychic
components and its development, identified with progress, toward scientific
rationality.
For all of these, God loomed as the great enemy. For Feuerbach, belief in
God fixed the human essence outside of itself; for Marx, it alienated the human
person from the practical, revolutionary activity by which alone praxis could
achieve freedom; for Nietzsche, God was the external finitude of the Overman
as something which would always transcend and so limit in frustration the
Overman; for Freud, belief in God was the permanent infantilization of the
human being.
What actually happened to the understanding of God under this massive
rise of atheism in the nineteenth century? Much more occurred than the conception of God as a projection of the human, a grammatical realization that
theology was really anthropology. Something much darker and more destructive
had been discovered in the divine. One can take a leaf from another book to
address this question.
When Ignatius of Loyola in his Spiritual Exercises wanted to name the
diabolical, to specify what Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Ivan called "the spirit of selfdestruction and non-existence," he did not use the term "Satan;' and only rarely
the name "Lucifer." 59 He spoke repeatedly of "el enemigo de natura humana"
59. For "Lucifer," see the "Meditaci6n de dos Banderas," in the Spiritual Exercises,
Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, Monumenta Ignatiana, ser. II, vol. 1, Exercitia Spiritualia,
ed. Josephus Calveras and Candidus de Dalmases (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis

122

MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, S.J.

- the enemy of human nature. 60 The profound insight into the diabolical
carried by this designation resumes a great deal of scriptural tradition and bears
very much upon the dialectics of the nineteenth century: the diabolical is the
destructively antihuman. Nietzsche perceptively saw this conclusion implicit in
the commitments of Continental atheism:
Theologically speaking - listen closely, for I rarely speak as a theologian it was God himself who at the end of his days' work lay down as a serpent
under the tree of knowledge: thus he recuperated from being God. - He had
made everything too beautiful. - The devil is merely the leisure of God on
that seventh day.61
This emerges as the final and devastating judgment upon all religious
reality: God is the alienation of humanity from its own essence, from its social
freedom, from its dynamic possibilities, from its mature self-responsibility and
growth. God is the enemy of humanity. This is the unique conclusion of the
atheism whose rise one can trace in the nineteenth century. It can subsequently
assume even the experiences that go with the "religious," with all of its sense of
integrity and dedication, so long as with John Dewey one will separate "the
religious" from the concept of God, dismissing the latter as fundamentally
incredible to the cultivated. 62 This judgment- that underneath the mask of
God one finds not so much the visage of the human as the face of Satan - is
perhaps the most radical change in religious understanding in the history of
religious belief. The divine has been turned into the diabolical. God has been
transformed into Satan.
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